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Abstract 
In third century China there was a discussion of whether language does or does not exhaust 
the meaning of words. There were three positions on language. First, that intuitive 
knowledge, which Confucian sages can acquire, cannot be expressed in language, that is 
language does not exhaust the meaning of words. Second, that there could be a gradual grasp 
of meaning through language and symbol. Third, that something which reaches into the mind 
is necessarily accompanied by language, that is to say language does exhaust the meaning of 
words. Each position reflects the view taken by each of the three scholars: He Yan 何晏; 
Wang Bi 王弼 of the Wei 魏 dynasty; and Ou Yangjian 欧陽建 of the Jin 晋 dynasty.  
The aim of this article is to consider their arguments in the context of contemporary 
epistemological knowledge. 
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要旨 
三世紀の中国では「言尽意・言不尽意（言は意を尽くすか否か）」という主題
をめぐって議論がなされていた。この議論には、言語に関する三つの捉え方が
あった。第一の立場は、儒教的聖人が体得できる直観的な知は、言語に依拠し
ては説明可能ではない、すなわち「言不尽意（言は意を尽くさず）」とするも
のである。第二の立場は、言語と象（『易』の卦象）とによって段階的に意を
捉えようと試みるものである。第三の立場は、所与として心に直接与えられた
認識は、必然的に言語をともなって把捉される、すなわち「言尽意（言は意を
  
尽くす）」というものである。これらの立場は、それぞれ魏の何晏、王弼、そ
して晋の欧陽建によって示されている。本論文の目的は、当時の認識論を背景
とするこの三者の行論を検討することにある。 
 
キーワード：魏晋玄学、何晏、王弼、欧陽建 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In third century medieval China, there was a philosophical discussion on whether language 
does or does not exhaust the meaning of words. It was a topic closely related to contemporary 
metaphysics. That is to say, underlying this argument is the intuitive understanding that the 
basis of creation and the principle being guaranteed is Dao道, and that language or rational 
knowledge is related to empirical knowledge. Reflections on language and rational 
knowledge began from this position. 
 
In this article, I will take this as being the philosophy of language in third century China, 
where there were three positions on language. The first position propounds that intuitive 
knowledge Confucian sages acquire cannot be expressed in language, i.e. language does not 
exhaust the meaning of words. The second puts forward that it is possible to attempt to 
gradually grasp meaning意 through language and symbol象. The third puts forward that 
something that reaches into the mind is necessarily accompanied by language, i.e. language 
does exhaust the meaning of words. Each reflects the view of each of three scholars: He Yan
何晏; Wang Bi王弼 of the Wei魏 dynasty; and Ou Yangjian欧陽建 of the Jin晋 dynasty. 
Previous studies have not carried out enough comparative analysis of the arguments of these 
three scholars. However, in my opinion, each scholar shares the same understanding that 
empirical knowledge precedes linguistic knowledge. In this article, I will consider their 
arguments in the context of contemporary epistemological knowledge. 
 
1. Language does not exhaust the meaning of words: He Yan 
 
He Yan incorporated the philosophy of Confucianism with Daoism by interpreting Dao as an 
ideal form of Confucianism based on the metaphysics of traditional Daoism, then locating (or  
 
 
 
  
ranking) the Confucian sages within the Dao. In Lunyu-Jijie論語集解 (The Commentaries on 
the Analects of Confucius by He Yan), He Yan states: 
 
[Lunyu] Kong Zi孔子 said, " I set my heart upon the Dao, base myself on 
Virtue徳, lean upon Benevolence仁 and take my recreation in the Arts芸1". 
 
[Commentary] ‘set my heart’ means longing. We cannot learn Dao by 
experience, so we long for it2. 
 
He Yan states that mastering the Dao is impossible for us, therefore we can only long for it. 
He Yan also describes the Dao as follows: 
 
To be precise, the Dao cannot be regarded as being. Heaven天 and Earth地 
and so on can be regarded as being. However, we call it Dao, because it 
exists in a hidden place. So, Dao can be named the Dao but it hides in a 
nameless state3. 
 
Dao refuses recognition by the five senses. However, He Yan says, we call it Dao as an 
object because Dao functions as a nameless concept. Then, Dao can be recognized only as an 
inexpressible something, as an object of intuition not of experience. In He Yan’s Dao Lun道
論 (Discourse on the Dao): 
 
There is no word when you want to talk. There is no name when you want to 
call. There is no shape when you want to see. There is no sound when you 
want to listen. If so, Dao is the faultless state4. 
 
In this sentence, it is repeatedly stated that Dao transcends language, notion and physical senses. 
He Yan’s quotations are based on the tradition of Daoist metaphysics, but He Yan ranks 
Confucian sages with the Dao. In He Yan's Wuming Lun無名論 (Discourse on the Nameless): 
 
The man admired by the public is famed有名. The man not admired is 
nameless無名. The sage regards nameless as famed, not admired as honored. 
By calling namelessness as Dao, and not admired as greatness大, sages as 
nameless can be remarked as famed, sages who are not admired can be 
honorable. However, do such sages have the same function as the man 
admired and famed described at first? In terms of nothingness, neither of  
 
  
them can be regarded as nothing, however sages are not one and the same 
beings as described at first because they are related to nothingness5. 
 
Defining fame有名 and namelessness無名 in terms of admiration誉 of the public, He Yan 
placed sages in the third position. The third position is fame in so far as fame is related to the 
nameless Dao. The fame that is defined as admiration by the public and the fame of sages are 
both fame. However, the fame of sages subsumes the namelessness of Dao. This logic 
equates the sages with the Dao. Then, if Dao transcends expression by language, sages related 
to Dao also transcend linguistic expression. In this sense, He Yan takes the position that 
language does not exhaust the meaning of words. 
 
[Lunyu] Kong Zi said, "Do I possess knowledge? No, I do not6". 
 
[Commentary] knowledge is to know meaning.  Knowledge is language 
which is not yet quite completely exhausted7. 
 
He Yan determined that knowledge is to know meaning, and stated that language is 
inadequate to exhaust the meaning of words. Then it follows that knowledge transcends 
language. In the following phrase from the Wuming Lun無名論, there are references to 
knowledge that transcends language. 
 
In the first place, it is nameless. Therefore we can denominate it by using all 
the names in the world. However, is this its true name? It can be represented 
metaphorically but finally cannot be realized悟. It is like saying that the Tai 
mountain泰山 is great but not understanding the materials気 that form the 
greatness of theTai mountain8. 
 
Namelessness is a negation of name. Namelessness surpasses the limitation of language and 
also transcends recognition by the five senses. Accordingly, it is possible that denomination 
by any notion is possible. But as long as it remains a linguistic understanding it is nothing 
more than an expression by metaphor; it cannot reach the knowledge that transcends 
language, namely realization. The metaphor of the Tai mountain means that the principal 
knowledge behind knowledge is brought to language; notion and senses can be gained only 
through realization, not through language. 
 
He Yan’s logic, which combines Confucianism with Daoism, associated Confucian sages 
with the inexpressible Dao. Accordingly, this means that it is impossible to express the 
  
intentions of the sages as well. That is exactly what He Yan means by language does not 
exhaust the meaning of words. Yet is the knowledge that transcends language indeed 
impossible to describe through language? Wang Bi and Ou Yangjian undertook to examine 
this kind of knowledge and language in their discussion. However, they have different 
opinions on the subject. 
 
2. Language, symbol and meaning: Wang Bi 
 
According to Wang Bi’s framework of metaphysics, he conceptualized metaphysical existences 
such as Dao and Wu無, but he considered them impossible to be described by language. 
 
The Dao that can be spoken, the name 名 that can be named, indicate 
abstract things and extend to every shape so they cannot have eternity常.  
That is why we cannot talk about them and denominate them9. 
 
The man who talks about Dao is spoiling that eternity. The man who names 
the Dao is departing from its true nature真10. 
 
In general, entities which have a denomination and a name are not their 
ultimate state極. Saying Dao entails that there is something that is the 
basis for this expression. Because of its basis, this expression will be 
permitted. Accordingly, the Dao that can be described is only the 
greatest among the entities that can be considered by designation称中
之大. But it is nothing compared to the greatness of that which is not 
designated無称之大11. 
 
Wang Bi also regarded the behavior of language, for example that of denominating, as a lack 
of universality. 
 
Denominating cannot identify it. Designating cannot express it thoroughly. 
Names necessarily have dividing lines between each other. Denominations 
necessarily have something on which they are based. If it were divided it 
could not be comprehensive. If it were based on others it could not be 
universal. If it were not comprehended, it would indeed depart from the truth. 
If it were not universal it could not be taken as a name12. 
 
 
  
From such an understanding of language, Wang Bi is considered to have based his position that 
language does not exhaust the meaning of words on a traditional reading13. However, I would 
suggest that Wang Bi does not have such a simplistic theory of ‘language does not exhaust the 
meaning of words’. Since Wang Bi places the idea of symbol 象 between language and 
meaning, in his Zhouyi-Lueli周易略例, (Discourse on the principle of interpretation of Zhouyi) 
he seeks to arrive at meaning through symbol instead of through language. 
 
To be precise, symbol is the measure with which to express meaning. 
Language is the measure with which to declare symbol. Symbol is an ideal to 
attain meaning. Language is an ideal to attain symbol. Since language is born 
of symbol, we can understand symbol by digging for language. Since symbol 
is born of meaning, we can understand meaning by digging for symbol. We 
can attain meaning by symbol. We can demonstrate symbol by language14. 
 
Wang Bi does not connect language to meaning directly, but establishes the three-part 
connection of language-symbol-meaning by introducing symbol. This three-part connection 
forms a class of ontology in which language arises out of symbol, and symbol arises out of 
meaning. On the other hand, it also forms an epistemological means-purposes relation which 
differs from its class. That is, with logical possibility, meaning may be attained by symbol, 
not by language directly. 
 
Wang Bi does not state that meaning can be brought to language and be expressible by 
language, but foresees the possibility of expressing meaning by designation through the 
medium of symbol. Then, how does Wang Bi describe the grasp of meaning by symbol? He 
describes it as follows: 
 
Therefore, language is the measure with which to declare symbol. After 
obtaining symbol, then language should be forgotten. Symbol is the measure 
with which to hold meaning. After obtaining meaning, then symbol should be 
forgotten. This is exactly similar to the tradition of Zhuang Zi荘子: a snare
蹄 is the measure with which to catch rabbits. After catching rabbits the 
snare is forgotten. A trap筌 is the measure with which to catch fish. After 
catching fish, the trap is forgotten. That is to say, language is the snare of 
symbol. Symbol is the trap of meaning15. 
 
Wang Bi compares the language-symbol-meaning convergence with the method of snare and 
trap of Zhuang Zi16. According to the interpretation of Cheng Xuanying成玄英, a trap is the 
  
basket used to corner and capture fish, and a snare is used to hook the legs of rabbits. For 
instance, just as one is able to gradually corner fish into baskets in the endlessly rushing river and 
just as one is able to capture rabbits in the vast fields, Wang Bi considers it possible to drive 
meaning into a corner and catch it through the two gradual steps of squeezing, i.e. 
language-describing/symbol-showing, based on the tradition of Zhuang Zi. Wang Bi heightens 
the possibility of exhausting the meaning of words by introducing symbol to his theory. 
 
Wang Bi believed that he could attain meaning by applying the theory described above. 
However, he debates the question regarding complete oblivion忘 of language and symbol 
after exhausting meaning through language and symbol. He also states that oblivion of the 
measures is the very attainment of meaning. 
 
So, remaining in language is not attaining symbol. Remaining in symbol is 
not attaining meaning. Since symbol is born of meaning, in the case of 
remaining in symbol, the part that remains is not symbol in itself of meaning. 
Since language is born of symbol, in the case of remaining in language, the 
part that remains is not language in itself of symbol. Therefore, oblivion of 
symbol is the attainment of meaning. Oblivion of language is the attainment 
of symbol. Oblivion of symbol is essential for the attainment of meaning. 
Oblivion of languages is essential for the attainment of symbol17. 
 
As long as we remain in language, we cannot attain symbol. Also, as long as we remain in 
symbol, we cannot attain meaning. Wang Bi states ‘oblivion of symbol is essential for the 
attainment of meaning. Oblivion of language is essential for the attainment of symbol’.  
Wang Bi’s theory which recognizes the oblivion of means as the attainment of aims is 
regarded as the failure of logic by traditional reading18. However my opinion is that this may 
not be the correct interpretation, and I would rather suggest that this logical turn is quite 
indispensable to his theory. 
 
Wang Bi introduced symbol as connected to meaning directly. Symbol is the direct measure 
with which to exhaust meaning. Toward the meaning which cannot be brought to language, 
which is beyond the expression of language, Wang Bi regarded that such meaning can be 
shown through the medium of symbol. However, Wang Bi’s theory itself is the linguistic 
description of meaning that is inexpressible by language. As it stands it seems to be a 
paradox. Therefore, Wang Bi should reject even his theory of language to overcome this  
 
 
  
paradox. The phrases ‘oblivion of symbol is essential for the attainment of meaning. Oblivion 
of language is essential for the attainment of symbol’ mean a reversal of the logical order. 
Wang Bi’s meaning is established as meaning in itself only by overturning his theory. 
 
3. Language exhausts the meaning of words: Ou Yangjian 
 
Ou Yangjian, who appeared shortly after He Yan and Wang Bi in history, ranked afresh the 
value of language as a common function with which to share knowledge against the 
contemporary language does not exhaust the meaning of words position. 
 
Undoubtedly, even if we gain reason理 in our mind, we cannot express it 
without language. Even if concrete things exist in themselves, we cannot 
distinguish them without language. If language does not express thought, we 
have no way to communicate with others. If name does not discriminate 
things, we have no way to judge things clearly. Names and values are 
different by defining judgments. Thoughts are expressed by the 
communication of language and names. Then, at their origin, things do not 
have spontaneous names and reason does not have a predetermined name.  
If you want to discern the actual truth, then you name them by different 
names. If you want to express your thought, then you establish 
denominations19. 
 
Ou Yangjian’s epistemology has two steps. In the first step the target of knowledge is brought 
to the mind directly without language. The second step is the discernment of objects grasped 
directly by the mind, by language. Language, for Ou Yangjian, has the function of analyzing 
reason and other concrete things which are inexpressible in themselves. Language is the 
indispensable instrument for communicating discreetly with others. Therefore, language 
and objects must form one-to-one corresponding relationships. 
 
Names are changed as things change, language is changed deriving from 
reason. They cannot exist separately from others like sounds and echoes, 
shapes and shadows. If they are not divided in two, then it is indisputable that 
language does not exhaust the meaning of words. Therefore, I insist that 
language exhausts the meaning of words20. 
 
 
 
  
Language varies with change or difference of objects and keeps incidental one-to-one 
relationships. After knowledge reaches the mind in a direct manner, language follows it.  
Then a vertical relationship is composed between language and objects as shown in the 
analogies of sound and echo, shape and shadow. Language follows the knowledge attained by 
the mind and corresponds to objects without excess or limit. Language and meaning are 
consistent in this position. Through the above conjecture, Ou Yangjian insisted that language 
exhausts the meaning of words. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The proposition that language exhausts the meaning of words is opposed to that of language 
not exhausting the meaning of words, however, the logic of each scholar does not fully 
oppose that of the others. Rather, each scholar shares the same understanding that empirical 
knowledge precedes linguistic knowledge. 
 
He Yan insisted that language does not exhaust the meaning of words, but Wang Bi and Ou 
Yangjian groped for the possibility that meaning could be attained. Here we can see the 
difference between the three scholars. Wang Bi produced symbol as a method of approaching 
that knowledge which is impossible to arrive at by language. He thought that meaning which 
cannot be represented by language can be represented through the medium of symbol. 
Finally, he believed in the possibility of understanding knowledge beyond language. On the 
other hand, Ou Yangjian trusted language, and thought language arrived at knowledge and 
then identified the unity between language and meaning.   
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1  子曰、志於道、拠於徳、依於仁、遊於芸。(『論語』述而) All quotations in this article are translated by the 
author from the original text. 
2 志、慕也。道不可体、故志之而已。(『論語集解』述而) 
3 夫道者、惟無所有者也。自天地已来皆有所有矣。然猶謂之道者、以其能復用無所有也。故雖処有名之
域、而没其無名之象。(『列子』仲尼篇注引何晏『無名論』) 
4 夫道之而無語、名之而無名、視之而無形、聴之而無声、則道之全焉。(『列子』天瑞篇注引何晏『道論』) 
5 為民所誉、則有名者也。無誉、無名者也。若夫聖人、名無名、誉無誉。謂無名為道、無誉為大、則夫無
名者、可以言有名矣。無誉者、可以言有誉矣。然与夫可誉可名者、豈同用哉。此比於無所有、故皆有所
有矣。而於有所有之中、当与無所有相従、而与夫有所有者不同。(『列子』仲尼篇注引何晏『無名論』) 
6 子曰、吾有知乎哉。無知也。(『論語』子罕) 
7 知者、知意之知也。知者、言未必尽。(『論語集解』子罕) 
8 夫唯無名。故可得遍以天下之名名之。然豈其名也哉。惟此足喩、而終莫悟。是観泰山之崇崛、而謂元
気不浩茫者也。(『列子』仲尼、注) 
9 可道之道、可名之名、指事造形、非其常也。故不可道、不可名也。(『老子道徳経注』第一章注) 
10 言之者失其常、名之者離其真。(『老子指略』) 
11 凡物有称有名、則非其極也。言道則有所由、有所由然後謂之為道。然則是道称中之大也。不若無称之
大也。(『老子道徳経注』第二十五章注) 
12 名之不能当、称之不能既。名必有所分、称必有所由。有分則有不兼、有由則有不尽。不兼則大殊其真、
不尽則不可以名(『老子指略』) 
13 HACHIYA Kunio 蜂屋邦夫 (1981). 
14 夫象者、出意者也。言者、明象者也。尽意莫若象、尽象莫若言。言生於象、故可尋言以観象。象生於
意、故可尋象以観意。意以象尽、象以言著。(『周易略例』明象) 
15 故言者所以明象、得象而忘言。象者所以存意、得意而忘象。猶蹄者所以在兔、得兔而忘蹄、筌者所以
在魚、得魚而忘筌也。然則、言者象之蹄也。象者意之筌也。(『周易略例』明象) 
16 荃者所以在魚、得魚而忘荃。蹄者所以在兔、得兔而忘蹄。言者所以在意、得意而忘言。吾安得夫忘言
之人、而与之言哉。(『荘子』外物) 
17 是故存言者、非得象者也。存象者、非得意者也。象生於意而存象焉、則所存者乃非其象也。言生於象
而存言焉、則所存者乃非其言也。然則、忘象者乃得意者也。忘言者乃得象者也。得意在忘象、得象在
忘言。(『周易略例』明象) 
18 HACHIYA Kunio 蜂屋邦夫 (1981), HORIIKE Nobuo 堀池信夫(1988) and YAMADA Fumio 山田史生(1999). 
19 誠以理得於心、非言不暢。物定於彼、非言不弁。言不暢志、則無以相接。名不弁物、則鑑識不顕。鑑
識顕而名品殊、言称接而情志暢。原其所以、本其所由、非物有自然之名、理有必定之称也。欲弁其実、
則殊其名、欲宣其志、則立其称。(『芸文類聚』言語所引欧陽建「言尽意論」) 
20 名逐物而遷、言因理而変。此猶声発響応、形存影附、不得相与為二。苟其不二、則無不尽。吾故以為
尽矣。(『芸文類聚』言語所引欧陽建「言尽意論」) 
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